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Literature and the Construction of Reality 
 
Venkat Ramanan 
 
Introduction 
The epistemological question of what is reality and how we acquire 
knowledge of the world has occupied the minds of thinkers for well over 
two millennia. During this period, one of the most prevalent notions has 
been that the world exists independently of our minds.1 Allied to this 
concept of an “objective reality” is the belief that the reality we can see 
around us may not be ‘ultimate’ reality. Plato added, as part of his theory of 
forms, that the world we see around us is not what is ultimately real but is 
merely its reflection.2 While there may be some differences in how this 
“metaphysical realism” is interpreted, the one thing that these philosophers 
across the millennia have agreed on, as the analytic philosopher Hilary 
Putnam pointed out, is the link between truth and objective validity: 
something can be called ‘true’ only if it corresponds to an independent 
objective reality.3 Consequently, in trying to understand reality we are 
forced to grapple with at least two questions: firstly, this reality which is 
allied with universal truths exists, the philosophers tell us, independent of 
our consciousness of it and secondly it may not be accessible to our minds. 
But while this transcendent reality may be beyond our reach we 
need some version of reality (even an imperfect one) that best fits human 
needs: namely, to provide the knowledge and meaning adequate for us to 
understand and navigate the world around us. This article considers the idea 
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that “radical constructivism” (as proposed by philosopher Ernst von 
Glasersfeld) offers an ideal framework for putting in place such a reality. 
But, for us to gain a fuller understanding of the efficacy of radical 
constructivism, I feel that it may be necessary to consider two other 
questions. They are: firstly, an examination of the fundamental biological 
and epistemological limitations that we are faced with when trying to 
fathom objective reality. Secondly, there appears also to be an inescapable 
gap between language – which we use as a primary – and perhaps unique – 
cognitive tool in our attempt to comprehend the world. I will therefore look 
at these two questions in the next two sections before identifying some 
features of this reality of the best fit that we seek and then moving on to 
examine radical constructivism itself. 
In the subsequent sections, I wish to show that literature – 
especially fiction – best meets the criteria for constructing such a model of 
reality of the best fit in line with what radical constructivism proposes. This 
discussion includes my argument that fiction is able in this process of 
shaping reality to not only overcome language’s inherent deficiencies but 
also engender social cohesion through its understanding and use of the 
concepts of the theory of mind. (This is also the reason why I have, prior to 
considering how literature enables us to construct reality, interposed a 
detailed discussion of the role of language.) 
 
Our limited understanding of reality 
Alcmaeon of Croton, a philosopher from the fifth century BCE, wrote that 
only “[t]he gods have certainty,” when it comes to comprehending 
objective reality, “whereas to us as men conjecture [only is possible].”4 
Discussed below are some reasons why, to paraphrase Alcmaeon, only 
inferences and guesswork are available to us for use in this quest. 
When logician and mathematician Kurt Gödel first published his 
two incompleteness statements about the limits of proof in formal systems 
in 1929, not many may have anticipated their implications for not only the 
fields of mathematics and logic but also other domains such as philosophy 
of mind and artificial intelligence. The first theorem postulates that “Any 
consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of elementary 
arithmetic can be carried out is incomplete; i.e., there are statements of the 
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language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F.” The second 
theorem goes on to add that such a formal system cannot prove that the 
system itself is consistent.5 These insights, Gödel concluded, led to the 
“amazing fact” that “our logical intuitions (i.e., intuitions concerning such 
notions as: truth, concept, being, class, etc.) are self-contradictory.”6 
While ostensibly applying only to mathematics and logic, Kurt 
Gödel’s idea which imposed limitations on knowledge and certainty and 
presaged much wider reverberations is not a lone example of its kind. We 
come across similar observations also in physics and epistemology, to 
name a few. Oxford physicist David Deutsch contends that as quantum 
interference – where a quantum particle or wave can influence the 
trajectory of another – is so prevalent there must be hosts of shadow 
particles that correspond to every single neutron or electron in the universe. 
Owing to this, Deutsch argues, “reality is a much bigger thing than it 
seems… most of it… invisible,” and what we observe is “the merest tip of 
the iceberg.”7 
In epistemology, Thomas Hofweber, a professor of philosophy at 
the University of North Carolina, divides the act of knowledge into two 
separate tasks: one is the ability to represent the world and the second to 
confirm that our representation is accurate. Our inability to complete either 
of the tasks can result in ignorance.8 There may moreover be some facts 
that humans cannot represent in thought or language. Hofweber refers to 
these as “ineffable facts”. Although it may be difficult to give examples of 
such facts (because if we were able to describe them we will be on the way 
to knowing them), Hofweber points out, “we might still have good reasons 
to think that there are such facts.” Hofweber suggests that “the answer to 
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this question is significant for our conceptions of ourselves… and for… an 
understanding of the world as a whole.”9  
Deutsch stresses in a similar vein the need to think of the nature of 
some entities “which, if any, can be explained only in a way that attributes 
an independent existence to them… [as they] must be part of the fabric of 
reality.”10 We need to enquire, for instance, whether abstract, non-physical 
entities – such as numbers and the laws of physics – exist. For this, Deutsch 
feels, we need to go beyond word usage. 11  It appears that this 
immeasurability may be a feature of reality at the level of the individual 
organisms too – for instance, even when we try to fathom not universes but 
just our fellow beings. In a seminal article from 1974 called “What it is like 
to be a bat?” American philosopher Thomas Nagel highlighted the 
difficulty of looking into and comprehending other minds. This hurdle 
arises because there is something that it feels like uniquely for each 
organism and another organism can never access that feeling.12 
With reference to the relationship between our minds and reality, 
Immanuel Kant pointed out that we use our mind to view reality but our 
mind organises and categorises reality and so what we may see is always a 
“coloured” version of objective reality. Kant stressed that “a real predicate 
(a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the 
endeavours of explanation and illustration.”13 In his argument, Kant cites 
the example of “a hundred real dollars” and explains how the idea of “a 
hundred possible dollars” is an inadequate representation of the former. 
This is because “as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the 
object… in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred 
real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars— that is, in the mere 
conception of them.”14 As Kant further argued15, we should be sceptical of 
any views of reality that are independent of human experience. As Ernst 
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von Glasersfeld suggests, for Kant what we perceive via experience is “the 
totality of objects of experience.” It is necessarily limited to our experience 
and is “not that mythical experiencer-independent world” which some 
dream of.16 
Glasersfeld thinks moreover that “man… alone is responsible for 
his thinking, his knowledge” and “we have no one but ourselves to thank 
for the world in which we appear to be living.”17 In support, he refers to 
how Sextus Empiricus, the Pyrrhonean philosopher, pondered - using an 
apple as an example - the question to what extent what we perceive using 
our senses corresponds to an objective reality. We may view the apple as 
being red, smooth and sweet. But it is far from evident that the “real” apple 
possesses these qualities (nor can it be concluded that these are the only 
properties an apple possesses.) These questions are unanswerable because 
no matter what we do, as Glasersfeld elucidates, we can verify our 
perceptions only by employing other perceptions, but never directly with 
the apple as it exists.18 Glasersfeld reiterates the comparability of this idea 
with that of Kant’s view of nature. For Kant too it is the raw material of 
sensory data that becomes our knowledge of objects. Glasersfeld adds that 
this “experiential world… makes no claim whatsoever about [its] 
correspondence with an ontological reality.”19  
Humberto Maturana, the Chilean biologist, lends support to these 
views while looking at cognition and perception from a biological 
perspective. He asserts that cognition “is a biological phenomenon and can 
only be understood as such; any epistemological insight into the domain of 
knowledge requires this understanding.” 20  Perception, Maturana 
emphasizes, is necessarily tied to the “anatomical and functional… 
[parameters of the organism] and not the properties of an independent 
reality.” Perception is “nothing but a process of construction and… cannot 
reflect an objective reality.”21 
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Language and its limitations 
The foregoing arguments lead us to the conclusion that there is necessarily 
a gap between our knowledge and what is thought of as “objective reality”. 
What exacerbates this gap is that language, in its use as a tool for 
apprehending the world around us, carries with it certain limitations. 
According to Brown University psycholinguist Julie Sedivy, the biggest 
way language may fail us is when it “under-specifies reality” as it is “a very 
indirect mapping of the world around us.”22 In this respect, language, 
instead of enhancing information, functions as a “great simplifier”.23 When 
we refer to an apple using a simple “symbolic word”, as Sedivy tells us – 
reminiscent of Sextus Empiricus employing the example of an apple to 
question how far what we perceive corresponds with objective reality - we 
remove from the apple all the sensory detail that defines it. 
This feature of language sloughing away information is related to 
the fact that language (as S.J. Schmidt, philosopher and communication 
theorist, has attempted to show) functions more as a “system of instruction 
[rather than] a system of information conveyance.” Schmidt argues that 
when two people communicate that act of communication produces 
information essentially by reducing uncertainties. In this sense, language is 
not “denotative”– where precise meaning is expected to be conveyed – but 
“connotative”.24 Schmidt adds that Maturana, the biologist, too stressed this 
view when the latter observed that in an interaction the speaker and the 
listener remain in their own cognitive domains. “In a strict sense, there is 
no transmission of information from the speaker to his interlocutor.”25 
It would therefore seem that what we call “meaning” may be a 
product of a set of cognitive systems where there is no certainty that what 
the speaker intended will be transmitted to the listener with the fullest 
fidelity. The listener hence has to “create” meaning via the interaction with 
the speaker (or speakers) and using socially generated linguistic and 
cultural conventions. In other words, meaning is a product of social 
collaboration. The American mathematician and philosopher Hilary 
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Putnam expanded upon how this partnership is achieved by proposing his 
“sociolinguistic hypothesis” including the concept of “linguistic division of 
labour”26. To elucidate these ideas, Putnam offers this analogy: to know the 
value of gold, you do not need to have been a producer of gold, a jeweller 
or be an expert in international trade. There are always others in society 
who can supply the necessary expertise. As Putnam puts it using another 
analogy, “words are more like ships” which involve the expertise of many 
people to operate - unlike “hammers or screwdrivers” which one person can 
use on his own27. In other words, they signify a co-operative linguistic 
activity and creation of meaning by society. 
Besides how meaning is created in this way, our beliefs and 
understanding of time also have considerable bearing on how we 
communicate. While meaning may be “out there” as Putnam’s arguments 
imply, a complete congruence between what is intended and what is 
understood is (we should reiterate) rarely if ever realised. A reason for this 
is that, as the American philosopher Donald Davidson has argued, “a 
central source of trouble… [for language] is the way beliefs and meaning 
conspire to account for utterances.”28 When a person holds an utterance he 
or she has heard to be true, Davidson explains, it is partly because of the 
speaker’s intentions and partly because of the speaker’s beliefs. Meaning 
and belief play “interlocking and complementary roles in the interpretation 
of speech”, Davidson notes, and hence the need to understand both to work 
out if our reading of what someone says is correct.29 
Our relationship with time too influences language in multiple 
ways. These include how our perception of time as a succession of discrete 
moments is reflected in the way language is structured. American 
philosopher Susanne Langer draws our attention to the fact that language 
possesses a linear and discrete order and the elements of language need to 
appear in a serial arrangement specified by its grammar. Because of this, 
when the rules of grammar are not correctly adhered to there is potential for 
meaning to be eroded. Langer explains that language requires us to present 
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our ideas in a linear fashion even though “their objects rest one within the 
other…”30 Langer illuminates this idea by using the metaphor of our 
clothes being strung side by side in a clothesline – not one over the other, 
the way we tend to wear them.  
Hence, while the nature of language may align with our perception 
of time, it nevertheless tends to collide with the nested nature of reality we 
experience when we apprehend the world - be it looking at a mountain, 
talking to someone or reading a book – when many of our senses are 
involved concurrently in the act of perception. This multi-dimensional 
feature of perception comes into play also when we tend to view our life as 
a coherent narrative where a separation of past, present and future is not 
that apparent.  
Lastly, the fact that the term “time” possesses a multiplicity of 
connotations adds considerable complexity to the interpretation of what is 
uttered by someone. Here are some examples. When someone asks, “What 
time is it?” what the speaker is referring to is usually quite obvious: it is a 
reference to time as a quantity measured in hours, minutes and seconds. But 
when the same person remarks “how time flies” it may not only refer to 
time as measured by clocks and calendars but can also denote an evaluation 
of the events in someone’s life. And, to consider another example, when we 
talk about “Elizabethan times”, we allude not only to the life and reign of 
the Good Queen Bess but perhaps also to epochs specifically associated 
with the monarch’s life. 
The word “time”, as Paul Valery pointed out, doesn’t thus pose any 
interpretational difficulties when used in an everyday expression. But it 
does become a problem when we look at it isolated from its context. Valery 
cites St Augustine’s famous question, “What is time?” as an example of the 
latter situation. When framed this way, Valery explains:  
The word then becomes an unfathomable enigma. It seems to have far more 
meaning than the sum of its uses in ordinary language. One might compare 
the word to a plank over an abyss that holds your weight without difficulty if 
you step briskly across it, but that breaks, plunging you into the chasm, if 
you stop half-way across… This word [then]… has become the object of a 
frightful philosophical desire. It changes itself into enigma, into abyss, into 
torment of thought...31 
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Reality is what best fits our requirement 
An idea that I hope stands out from what is discussed so far is this: in our 
attempts to decipher objective reality and understand the world, we are 
reliant on our senses, intellect, language and our mind – but they are not 
perfect tools. But, what is remarkable is that our experience of the world 
nevertheless seems generally rational and stable, despite these handicaps. 
We have in other words some version of reality that appears to function like 
a working model that may (to some extent at least) suit our requirements in 
our attempt to find answers to what makes for a meaningful life. 
How do we explain this? Or, is it worth explaining? Giambattista 
Vico, the 18th century philosopher and historian, considered these questions 
moot points. This is because Vico held, as Glasersfeld explains32, that this 
world we get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves: in which 
case it is no surprise that it appears rational and stable to us. Vico alludes 
further to the separation between a transcendent reality and the reality we 
construct when he observes that “[a]s God’s truth is what God comes to 
know as he creates and assembles it, so human truth is what man comes to 
know as he builds it shaping it by his actions.”33 For Vico the only way of 
“knowing” something is by putting together that knowledge via our senses 
and experiences without being able to resort to some a priori, immutable 
principles.34 Furthermore, Vico’s observation that human truth is what is 
revealed to us when we build that knowledge has strong links to the human 
aspiration for finding meaning in our lives. We are not certain if there is 
meaning behind the universe. Answering this question requires perhaps 
lifting the veil around objective reality. Faced with these impediments, we 
create instead our own meaning, defined by our experiences and the moral 
universe we identity and adhere to. 
What is also noteworthy is that we are also mostly unaware of how 
we seemingly experience a rational and stable world. Glasersfeld, while 
noting this fact, feels that a closer awareness of how we acquire this 
knowledge, could help us do better. In other words, we need to look for 
strategies that can improve this model of reality that we construct and can 
work with. As Glasersfeld tells us, “if, as Alcmaeon… suggested, the 
human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the 
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world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be 
viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards 
the goals he chooses.”35 The success of this key, Glasersfeld adds, does not 
depend on finding a lock it can open, but whether it is good enough to open 
any lock that opens the way to the particular goals we want to realise.36 
And, these goals may not be limited to the “human truths” that 
Giambattista Vico talked about (and these verities may not necessarily be 
the same as the perhaps unattainable universal truths from some 
metaphysical realm). We would hope that the process will provide us with 
knowledge, meaning and an inner certainty and growth of authenticity that 
would lead us to what Paul Valery termed as “a beginning of our selves.”37 
 
Radical constructivism and the cognitive construction of reality 
In this section, I intend to show that what could serve as a possible template 
for identifying this key that can unlock a better fitting reality for us – in 
other words enhance its suitability to the human aspirations we referred to 
above - is another idea proposed by Ernst Glasersfeld: what he calls 
“radical constructivism”. Radical constructivism begins with the premise 
that knowledge is not something that can be exchanged like a commodity 
between one person’s mind and another. The thinking person therefore “has 
no alternative but to construct what he or she knows on the basis of their 
own experience.”38 Allied to this thought is Glasersfeld’s observation that 
all human experience is essentially subjective and we have no way of 
knowing whether others’ experiences are like ours. And what’s more, the 
interpretation of language is no exception to this dictum.39  
An idea that is fundamental to radical constructivism is that “man – 
and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, 
therefore… we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which 
we appear to be living.”40 To explain this idea - which, with its sanguinity, 
has a kinship closer to humanism rather than existentialism - Glasersfeld 
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uses the metaphor of how a bricklayer constructs a wall. Whenever the 
bricklayer comes across the need for the opening for a door or window, he 
realises he needs to provide for a supporting arch at that point. The arch in 
this case can be viewed as a limitation endemic to the design, analogous to 
the constraints we looked at earlier in relation to our cognitive tools. But 
such a limitation, Glasersfeld argues, should not however be mistaken for a 
fundamental law of nature or an attribute of objective reality. Glasersfeld 
contends that we instead “experience these constraints from the ‘inside’, as 
it were.” 41  “What we experience and the knowledge we acquire,” 
Glasersfeld reiterates, “is necessarily built up of our own building blocks 
and can be explained in no other way than in terms of our ways and means 
of building.”42 
As noted earlier, Glasersfeld felt that an understanding of our 
responsibility for the world we create together with “an awareness of this 
operating” can help us do it better. 43  More importantly, this goal of 
improving our picture of reality requires not mere passive absorption of 
external stimuli but an active and discerning use of our cognitive apparatus. 
We need also to be cognisant of the fact that our “knowledge does not 
reflect an objective ontological reality” but requires “an ordering and 
organizing of a world constituted by our experience.”44  
This activity moreover does not consist in simply “manipulating… 
‘things in themselves’ “45 (entities akin to the Kantian ding an sich, objects 
as they are before we perceive them). In this situation, we do not receive a 
pre-packaged picture, so to speak, of reality. Instead, we build reality from 
the bottom up. This involves what Jean Piaget called a “cognitive 
construction” of reality where knowledge is built up by a cognitive entity 
which “organizes the world by organizing itself.” 46  “For Piaget,” 
Glasersfeld tells us, “organization is always the result of a necessary 
interaction between conscious intelligence and environment.”47 
Glasersfeld compares this organising feature of cognitive 
construction to watching a movie. We may be aware that a film is made up 
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of a series of slightly different static images. If, however, we wish to 
perceive (and enjoy) the narrative underlying that sequence of images we 
need to indulge in certain specific cognitive activities. Whether or not the 
horse that appears in the movie really did walk around at some time 
somewhere we are forced (as Glasersfeld explains) when watching the film 
to construct the horse’s motion by perceiving a series of images as one 
“moving” sequence. What is more important, Glasersfeld adds, “[t]he fact 
that we do that unconsciously cannot alter the fact that we have to do it in 
order to perceive the motion.”48 
 
Literature and constructivism 
While discussing such constructive theories - including Glasersfeld’s 
radical constructivism - in general, S.J. Schmidt notes that “reality (in the 
sense of world models) is always a ‘construct’” - whether in “fiction” or in 
“reality”. Schmidt also highlights that “none of these exists; but some of 
them fit better”49 - which resonates with our references in the previous 
section to the human search for a model of reality that suits our needs. 
This comment by Schmidt implies that fiction is as good a tool as 
any for providing us with a suitable model of reality. I would argue further 
that fiction (despite the distorting nature of language) in fact best meets the 
criteria for such a task. I intend to explain in the next two sections how 
fiction can achieve this in various ways including how fictional narratives 
and the characters developed within them can perform as pointers towards 
how we construct reality by organizing ourselves, in line with what 
Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism tells us.  
As we saw earlier, one of the significant tenets of Glasersfeld’s 
theory is about the impossibility of a complete exchange of knowledge 
between two minds. Instead, “[w]hat we experience, cognize, and come to 
know,” Glasersfeld contends “is necessarily built up of our own building 
blocks and can be explained in no other way than in terms of our ways and 
means of building.”50 Glasersfeld cites the example of John Fowles’s novel 
The Magus to explain how a work of fiction can best explain his 
constructivist ideas including that we have no choice but (to paraphrase 
Glasersfeld’s earlier observation) to organise ourselves in order to organise 
                                                
48 Glasersfeld, ‘Introduction to Radical Constructivism’, p. 81. 
49 Schmidt, ‘The Fiction is that Reality Exists’, p. 267. 
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the world around us. He considers The Magus as “one of a small number of 
literary works into which I can read… a view of the world and a 
constructivist theory of knowledge that I have worked at for a good many 
years.”51 
In The Magus, the narrator Nicholas, a disillusioned poet 
contemplating suicide, falls under the spell of Conchis - a Prospero-like 
figure - who is the owner of an estate in a Mediterranean island. Nicholas 
then becomes an unwitting performer in the psychological games that 
Conchis plays and loses gradually the ability to distinguish the real from 
the artificial. He realises in the end that the stories that Conchis enacts are 
not actually from Conchis’s life but his own. Nicholas comes to understand 
partway through the story also that he has no control over the events taking 
place around him and this leads to a sense of self-pity and despair. 
Glasersfeld compares this disillusionment to our misconceptions about 
reality, our futile ambition to hold objective reality in our hands. “Like 
many of us,” Glasersfeld notes, “[Nicholas] knew what the world was like. 
He himself had loaded the dice long ago by unquestioningly accepting a 
naïve, commonplace view of the world.” 52  These misapprehensions 
emanate from the fact that there is no absolute knowledge and this is one of 
the themes of the book. Fowles acknowledges this in his preface to The 
Magus when he writes that it is about “a series of human illusions about 
something that does not exist: absolute knowledge and absolute power.”53 
Glasersfeld however perceives this not solely as a case of our 
illusions getting annihilated by reality. But, alongside this destruction 
comes also “the growth of an… inner confidence.” In his view The Magus 
is “one long chess game between knowledge and certainty.” As what 
Fowles calls the “Godgame” progresses, there is a growth in inner certainty 
in the narrator and a rise in the balance between knowledge and being. This 
is when, as Glasersfeld points out, Conchis begins to show Nicholas (and 
the reader) that it is the experiencer who creates reality by discerning the 
relationship between the “facts” and “the structures he comes to consider 
real.”54 With growth in knowledge and self-assurance, the experiencer can 
create his or her own narratives and learn to live with it. 
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Glasersfeld feels that in The Magus Fowles illustrates also the 
subject-dependent nature of reality that is constructed by us - an idea that is 
“the core of constructivist epistemology”, as Glasersfeld tells us55 - when 
Conchis explains the nature of coincidence to Nicholas by referring to two 
dramatic incidents. The first one is about the burning down of a chateau 
belonging to a wealthy art collector. The second one is about a hermit who 
has been awaiting the coming of God for several years. One night the 
hermit gets the vision he has been waiting for and it is also the night when 
the chateau burnt down. Is there a connection between these two events? 
“There is no connection,” Conchis asserts. On the other hand, “I am what 
the connection is, I am whatever meaning the coincidence has.” 56 
Glasersfeld identifies a similarity between this avowal by Conchis and “an 
everyday paraphrase of Einstein” whose remarkable insight was that “there 
is no simultaneity without an observer.” Constructive theory holds that not 
only coincidences, but also the events behind them and “even those 
experimental compounds that we call ‘objects’… come about through the 
experiencer…”57 
As for objects, the more we move away from what we call 
‘objective reality’, the reality that we build too moves away from “the 
world of manipulable objects,” as the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur 
notes.58 Ricoeur adds that by aiding this transformation (as The Magus was 
seen to do by Glasersfeld) literature - especially in its employment of 
imagination in poetry and fiction - makes a “productive reference” to 
reality. Ricoeur equates this concept to reality shaping. In this context he 
juxtaposes the adjective “productive” against the term “reproductive” to 
signify not just the replication of a referent but as a process that involves 
creating something anew. To explain this point, Ricoeur compares literary 
works of imagination to images (such as photographs). Images have a pre-
existing referent that they can reproduce whereas fiction does not possess 
such a referent. Ricoeur therefore considers fiction’s productive reference 
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to reality as paradoxical: that only fiction - which does not already have a 
referent - is able to reveal the world to us.59 
Ricoeur argues also that fiction’s “productive state of 
imagination”60 is able even to “increase” reality via what he terms “iconic 
augmentation”.61 Iconic augmentation occurs when something enables us to 
see the world in a different way. Ricoeur gives for example the invention of 
the alphabet and its development across a number of stages, from 
pictograms and ideograms to associating sounds with elements of the 
alphabet. What was remarkable about this process was that our capacity for 
expressing thoughts increased with a reduction in the number of elementary 
signs in the language. Ricoeur thinks that this feature is a “decisive 
condition of all iconic augmentation, for it is in abridging his alphabet that 
man simultaneously increases the generative power contained in the… 
ensemble of discreet units.”62 
After explaining iconic augmentation thus, Ricoeur draws a parallel 
between fiction and painting both of which appear “to be an attempt to 
capture the universe in a web of abridged signs,” by offering characteristics 
comparable to the alphabet, such as concision and generative power.63 
Ricoeur then goes on to assert that fiction advances a function akin to that 
of painting in this respect in presenting a different world to us when it 
“redescribes reality. One sort of language describes reality; then… a second 
sort of language arises to redescribe the world.”64 Ricoeur asserts also that 
“iconic augmentation is the rule for poetry” and this “creative 
reconstruction” - which is not simply a duplication - is realised “by means 
of the mediation of fiction”.65 Ricoeur equates this process to a “mimesis of 
reality” where the poet fashions a new mythos of reality.66 
There is also a noticeable similarity between Ricoeur’s idea that 
fiction produces reality and Julie Sedivy’s thoughts on the purpose of 
fiction. Sedivy holds that fiction helps us assimilate the world. It allows us 
to “step out of the constraints of actual reality to project ourselves into 
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possibilities that don’t exist, might exist, may not exist, might have existed 
in the past.”67 What makes fiction so powerful, Sedivy thinks, is that it is 
able to create for the reader “an incredible space to explore hypotheses… 
[and] to generate, to create in language, worlds that aren’t in front of us.”68 
 
Literature and the theory of mind 
J.A. Baker’s book The Peregrine is a recounting of the author’s 
observations of that eponymous avian over a few months as part of a much 
longer obsession with following the behaviour of these birds of prey. 
Philosopher John Gray views this book as a tribute to the sense of freedom 
the bird evoked in the author. Gray then makes a more telling point when 
he adds that “the book is a record of the author’s struggle to see the 
landscape in which he pursued the bird through the eyes of the bird 
itself.”69 Some may recall that there have in the past been other similar 
narratives - such as Richard Bach’s Jonathan Livingston Seagull - wherein 
the author exhibits an understanding and oneness with an animal that may 
transcend normal cognitive boundaries. These writers succeed eminently at 
providing a “first person account” as it were of, say, what it feels like to 
glide on jet streams or how to spot and swoop on prey from miles away. 
What is also remarkable is the author’s desire - and ability - to get 
into the mind of an animal and to experience the world - and tell us about it 
from the perspective of the animal (without trying to “humanise” the 
animal). A New York Times essay - about, among other questions, why we 
care so much about fictional characters - points out that “this layered 
process of figuring out what someone else [whether human or animal] is 
thinking… is both a common literary device and an essential survival 
skill.”70 The essay offers the sentence “Peter said that Paul believed that 
Mary liked chocolate” as an illustration of this process. (While these 
remarks refer to such a feature with reference mainly to humans, the books 
by writers such as Baker and Bach bear witness to the fact that this 
interpretation can apply to our relationships with other animal species too.) 
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While referring to this process as “mind reading” may sound like 
something out of folk psychology, it is something cognitive science equates 
with what it calls the “theory of mind”. As Lisa Zunshine, a professor of 
English at the University of Kentucky, explains, the theory of mind refers 
to our ability to explain a person’s (or animal’s, as Baker attempts to do) 
mind and how “we attribute to [that] person a certain mental state”71 based 
on their behaviour. This model of the mind tells us that cognition may not 
be limited to our own minds alone (otherwise we may run the risk of 
lapsing into solipsism). Instead, in our everyday lives and within a social 
context we assume the existence too of “other minds” who possess 
thoughts and aspirations like our own. 
“Writers intuitively exploit our constant readiness to posit a mind 
whenever we observe behaviour,” Zunshine tells us. Zunshine then adds, 
“when we compose an essay… a song, a novel… [we] try to imagine how 
this or that segment of our target audience will respond to it.”72 When a 
writer is able to skilfully employ empathy and other emotional skills to 
describe what goes on in other minds it has an effect of triggering similar 
feelings in the reader too.  
There are also some other benefits that we can derive from reading 
good literature, as Julie Sedivy points out. Sedivy feels, for instance, that 
exposure to language that talks about the idea of peering into other people’s 
mind in fact increases our ability to read other minds.73 Good literature has 
also the potential to enhance our social intelligence, the ability to interact 
with others successfully, the ability to read communication with implied 
meanings and to be open and flexible in the way one communicates. The 
evolution of literature toward inner voices, Sedivy contends, has as a matter 
of fact been driven by an increased awareness of the importance of social 
intelligence.74  
In her view of how fiction generates reality, Lisa Zunshine reveals 
an affinity with Glasersfeld’s idea that we organise the world not by merely 
manipulating things in themselves but by constructing reality from the 
bottom up. “Fictional narratives,” Zunshine believes, “endlessly experiment 
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with rather than automatically execute our evolved cognitive 
adaptations.” 75  An example of this experimentation is how writers 
challenge the “cognitive constraints” that science may identify. Zunshine 
claims that in fact “where there is a cognitive constraint, there is a 
‘guarantee’ of sorts that writers will intuitively experiment in the direction 
of challenging that constraint…” 76  Cognitive constraints thus present 
writers with “creative openings rather than with a promise of stagnation and 
endless replication of established forms.”77 
An example of how writers challenge a cognitive constraint - such 
as the limit on the number of mental states we may be able to process 
without difficulty - can be seen in the use by writers of fiction of the 
technique known as the “free indirect style”. This involves the deliberate 
mixing up of first-person and third-person narratives. Paul Scott, for 
instance, uses this mode quite well in his The Raj Quartet novels about the 
last days of British rule in India. Blakey Vermeule, an associate professor 
of English at Stanford, has looked at “free indirect style” from an 
evolutionary perspective and thinks that it evolved because it satisfies our 
“intense interest in other people’s secret thoughts and motivations,” as it 
enables the reader to dwell in multiple states of mind at a time.78 
Another way that writers attempt to defy cognitive limitations is, as 
Zunshine points out, to “manipulate the amount and kind of interpretation 
of the characters’ mental states that they supply themselves and that they 
expect us [the readers] to supply.”79 This can be done by both over-
interpreting and under-revealing the characters’ feelings and motivations. 
Zunshine cites Henry James as an example of the former and Hemingway’s 
writing as illustrative of the latter. Hemingway is, for instance, as Zunshine 
indicates, known to occasionally use the description of his protagonist’s 
physical action as a proxy for what the character thinks and leaving the 
reader to guess the character’s emotional state.80 Award winning novelist 
Cormac McCarthy uses a similar ploy where the punctuations and grammar 
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relating to dialogue are only inferred. This forces the reader to “listen” 
more carefully to what is being said.  
Despite the differences between the literary devices and stratagem 
employed by writers ranging from Henry James to Hemingway and the 
others we have cited so far, an objective common to all of them appears to 
be a desire to not simply describe but to make the reader participate in the 
probing and relate to the psychological experiences of the characters. Julie 
Sedivy believes that fiction of this nature has actually shaped our culture by 
pushing us “to be more attentive to… the intricate, complex contents of 
each other’s minds and [training us to explore] what other people are 
thinking and feeling.”81 
When the reader is thus left to figure out the mental state of a 
character in a novel it bears a similarity too to how we deal with multi-
layered social encounters in real life. In such situations, even if our 
understanding of what the other person is thinking may not be wholly 
accurate, it is (as Lisa Zunshine explains) “the default way by which we 
construct and navigate our social environment.” 82  Fiction, Zunshine 
contends, delivers a fecund stimulus to our “mind-reading and mind-
tracking” cognitive abilities that are vital for this social interaction. We 
derive such a bounty from fiction by imagining what goes on in the minds 
of the characters, following the pointers provided by the author to such 
mental states and comparing our ideas about them with what either the 
author may tell us or with the thought processes of the other characters in 
the story. “Many of us come [in fact] to enjoy such stimulation to such a 
degree,” as Zunshine opines, “that we need it as a steady supplement to our 
daily social interactions.”83 
 
Conclusion 
We have noted in this article how owing to various constraints - some 
evolutionary, some epistemological - we may never have direct access to 
objective reality, that realm of universal truths. We have also looked at how 
one of our primary cognitive tools - namely, language - too exacerbates the 
difficulties with this quest. This is because of the way language works: it 
packs all the sounds we can make into a finite number of vowels and 
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consonants. While this provides great concision in how we communicate, it 
risks eroding meaning and knowledge. Samuel Beckett hence called 
language a veil. As Sedivy elucidates, language creates a veil “between the 
thing that it’s describing and the way in which it’s described.”84 
But in order to find meaning in our lives, we are impelled to 
fashion - while also utilising the pointers provided by Glasersfeld’s radical 
constructivism - a working model of reality (albeit imperfect) adequate for 
our purposes. We have in this article also seen how literature is able, as part 
of this process, to circumvent the constraints posed by language and to 
ameliorate the other constraints we looked at. Literature is able in this 
respect to fulfil the task of being a “universal translator”, a term Baudelaire 
is reputed to have used to refer to poets as they, in his view, translate the 
language of the universe into the language of man.85 While drawing our 
attention to Baudelaire’s observation, the Mexican poet Octavio Paz 
asserted that poets “have always had something to show modern man.”86 
Paz felt that poets - whom he referred to as “muses of the moment” - were 
able to do so by opening for us “a window to the other side of time - 
eternity”.87 
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